FBI whistleblowers — 18 May 2023

Frame

On 18 May 2023, the House Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government convened at 10:05 a.m. in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, with Chairman Jim Jordan (R-OH) presiding.¹ The hearing examined FBI whistleblower allegations through testimony from Garrett O'Boyle (former FBI Special Agent), Stephen Friend (former FBI Special Agent), Marcus Allen (Staff Operations Specialist, FBI), and Tristan Leavitt (President, Empower Oversight).²

Chairman Jordan opened by characterizing the witnesses as individuals who "took their oath seriously" and "came forward" to report concerns about FBI practices, which he described as politically driven targeting.³ Ranking Member Stacey Plaskett (D-VI) countered that the witnesses were "men who lost their security clearances because they were a threat to our national security, who out of malice or ignorance or both" had acted improperly, and characterized the hearing as part of an effort to "attack, discredit, and ultimately dismantle the FBI."⁴

This is a signed reconstruction from the official Government Publishing Office hearing record (Serial No. 118–21, CHRG-118hhrg52419). Where testimony is referenced, it represents character-exact extracts from the opened primary source identified in footnotes.

What the record shows

The witnesses

The hearing record identifies four witnesses who testified under oath.²

Garrett O'Boyle appeared as a former FBI Special Agent who had previously served in the United States Army infantry, deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁵ During his FBI service, O'Boyle stated he "received the highest annual review an employee can receive" and was selected for FBI SWAT.⁶ O'Boyle testified that he was suspended on his first day at a new FBI assignment after relocating his family: "They ordered me to report to the new unit when our youngest daughter was two weeks old. Then on my first day on the new assignment, they suspended me, rendering my family homeless. They refused to release our goods, including our clothes, for weeks."⁷

Stephen Friend appeared as a former FBI Special Agent with 8½ years of service, identifying himself at the hearing as a Senior Fellow for the Center for Renewing America.⁸ Friend testified that in August 2022 he made "protective whistleblower disclosures to my immediate supervisor" regarding concerns about FBI case management departures and the use of SWAT operations for suspects "accused of nonviolent crimes and misdemeanors represented by counsel and who pledged to cooperate with the Federal authorities in the event of criminal charges created an unnecessary risk to FBI personnel and public safety."⁹ Friend stated that "the FBI weaponized the security clearance processes to facilitate my removal from active duty within one month of my disclosures."¹⁰

Marcus Allen appeared as an FBI Staff Operations Specialist in the Charlotte Field Office, testifying that he had been "suspended without pay for over a year."¹¹ Allen stated he had served in the United States Marine Corps from 2000–2005, including two tours in Iraq, and was FBI Employee of the Year in 2019 for the Charlotte Field Office.¹² Allen testified that "the FBI suspended my security clearance, accusing me of actually being disloyal to my country" based on "unsubstantiated accusations that I hold conspiratorial views regarding the events of January 6, 2021, and that I allegedly sympathize" with criminal conduct.¹³ Allen stated: "I was not in Washington, DC, on January 6th, played no part in the events of January 6th, and I condemn all criminal activity that occurred."¹⁴

Tristan Leavitt appeared as President of Empower Oversight, representing Friend and Allen.¹⁵ Leavitt testified about FBI whistleblower protection procedures and characterized security clearance suspension as a retaliatory practice: "When the FBI suspends a clearance, it also immediately suspends the employee indefinitely without pay."¹⁶

The majority position

Chairman Jordan opened by asserting that "Politics is driving the addenda in Federal agencies" and characterizing FBI actions as politically motivated targeting: "Parents attending a school board meeting, pro-lifers praying at a clinic, or Catholics simply attending mass, you could be a target."¹⁷ Jordan described the witnesses' personnel actions as retaliation for protected disclosures.

Jordan's opening statement summarized each witness's situation. For O'Boyle: "The first day he arrives here, after being selected for this new unit, serving in our military, serving well in the FBI, the first day he arrives here, they tell him his clearance is suspended. He can’t get his belongings for his family. Can’t get his clothes. Can’t get his children’s clothes, four kids and a two-week-old newborn."¹⁸ For Friend: "Mr. Friend raised concerns about using the SWAT team to arrest someone who was willing to turn themselves in, and the FBI takes his clearance."¹⁹ For Allen: "he lost his clearance for simply doing his job, compiling case-related research, using open-source material, news, and articles and passing them on to people working the case."²⁰

Jordan stated that O'Boyle went "200-and-some days without getting paid" and Allen went "450 days without getting paid."²¹

The minority position

Ranking Member Plaskett opened by characterizing the subcommittee's work as politically motivated: "My colleagues on the far right are on a mission to attack, discredit, and ultimately dismantle the FBI. This is defunding the police on steroids."²² Plaskett described the witnesses as "men who lost their security clearances because they were a threat to our national security, who out of malice or ignorance or both" had acted improperly.²³

Plaskett stated: "When the FBI investigates conservative Christian White, men who are actually threatening violence, suddenly my Republican colleagues are rushing to defund the police."²⁴ She concluded: "This is not a Committee on the Weaponization of Government. This is a Committee for the Weaponization of Government."²⁵

Plaskett also stated: "Today is our fourth hearing in this Select Committee."²⁶ This contextualized the May 18 hearing within a series of subcommittee proceedings.

Testimony themes

The witnesses testified under oath about their FBI experiences and the circumstances of their security clearance suspensions or revocations.

O'Boyle's account focused on the timing and consequences of his clearance suspension. He testified: "I am here today because, even though I am wrongfully suspended from the FBI, I remain duty bound to the American people to play my small role in rectifying these issues. After all, I never swore an oath to the FBI. I swore an oath to the Constitution."²⁷ O'Boyle described the suspension occurring immediately upon arrival at his new assignment after relocating his family.⁷

Friend's account focused on concerns about FBI case management and SWAT tactics in January 6 investigations. Friend testified that he "believed our departures from case management rules established in the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide could have undermined potentially righteous prosecutions and may have been part of an effort to inflate the FBI’s statistics on domestic extremism."²⁸ Friend also stated: "In violation of HIPAA, individuals at the FBI leaked my private medical information to a reporter at The New York Times."²⁹

Allen's account focused on sharing open-source research about January 6 and the FBI’s characterization of that activity. Allen testified that "it appears that I was retaliated against because I forwarded information to my superiors and others that questioned the official narrative of the events of January 6th."³⁰ Allen stated that he "was not even interviewed by anyone from the FBI until May 2022. I was suspended in January 2022."³¹ Allen testified about financial hardship: "It has been more than a year since the FBI took my paycheck from me, and we’re getting financially crushed."³²

Leavitt's account focused on FBI whistleblower protection procedures. Leavitt testified that "FBI whistleblowers have second-class status compared to those in most Federal agencies."³³ Leavitt stated: "The FBI’s latest troubling practice is suspending security clearances to retaliate against whistleblower."³⁴

What remains contested

Whistleblower versus security risk

The fundamental characterization of the witnesses remained unresolved. The majority position, articulated by Chairman Jordan, held that the witnesses were retaliated against for raising legitimate concerns about FBI politicization and operational practices. The minority position, articulated by Ranking Member Plaskett, held that security clearances were suspended because the individuals posed national security threats.

The hearing presented competing narratives about the same personnel actions. Jordan characterized O'Boyle as having been "selected for this new unit, serving in our military, serving well in the FBI" before being suspended.¹⁸ Plaskett characterized the witnesses collectively as "men who lost their security clearances because they were a threat to our national security, who out of malice or ignorance or both" had acted improperly.²³

The hearing record does not include testimony from FBI officials explaining the specific basis for each clearance suspension or revocation. The witnesses testified about their understanding of why they were suspended; the FBI’s documented rationale for the personnel actions is not presented in the May 18, 2023, hearing transcript.

The credibility question

The witnesses' accounts were contested by the minority. Plaskett stated: "We are assembled today to hear conspiracy theories and speculations. We’re going to hear alternative facts, actions and events taken far out of context."³⁵ The majority defended the witnesses' credibility and characterized minority criticism as attempts to intimidate whistleblowers.

Whether specific allegations made by the witnesses—including Friend's concerns about case management statistics, Allen's characterization of his January 6 research sharing as protected activity, and O'Boyle's timeline of his suspension—can be independently verified from FBI records remained unresolved. The hearing presented witness testimony but did not produce internal FBI documents, personnel files, or security clearance adjudication records.

The retaliation question

The core legal dispute remained unresolved: whether the adverse personnel actions reflected retaliation for protected disclosures or appropriate responses to legitimate security concerns. The witnesses testified that they faced retaliation. The FBI’s position was not directly represented through testimony from FBI officials at this hearing.

Friend testified that his clearance revocation occurred "within one month of my disclosures."¹⁰ Allen testified that he was suspended in January 2022 but "was not even interviewed by anyone from the FBI until May 2022."³¹ The temporal proximity between disclosure activity and personnel action was established by witness testimony. Whether that proximity constituted causation—retaliation rather than coincidence—remained contested.

The hearing did not produce comprehensive personnel records, security clearance investigation files, or adjudication decisions that would allow independent assessment of whether the suspensions were procedurally appropriate or substantively justified.

January 6 case handling

Allen's testimony addressed concerns about how the FBI handled cases arising from January 6, 2021. Allen testified that he shared "information to my superiors and others that questioned the official narrative of the events of January 6th."³⁰ Allen stated that the FBI characterized this activity as evidence of "conspiratorial views regarding the events of January 6, 2021, and that I allegedly sympathize" with criminal conduct.¹³

Friend testified about concerns regarding FBI case management in January 6 investigations, stating he believed "departures from case management rules" may have been "part of an effort to inflate the FBI’s statistics on domestic extremism."²⁸

The hearing did not resolve whether FBI January 6 investigative practices reflected appropriate case management, statistical manipulation, or a contested middle ground. No FBI case files, field office communications, or headquarters directives regarding January 6 investigations were introduced into the May 18, 2023, hearing record.

Limits

This reconstruction is bound to the official GPO hearing record from May 18, 2023 (Serial No. 118–21, CHRG-118hhrg52419). The following constraints apply:

No FBI institutional response. The hearing featured testimony from three individuals who experienced adverse FBI personnel actions and one attorney representing two of them. No FBI officials testified. The FBI’s documented rationale for suspending or revoking security clearances, its assessment of the witnesses' conduct or reliability, and its response to specific allegations raised by the witnesses are not included in this hearing record.

No independent verification. The hearing presented witness testimony about their experiences, their understanding of why they were suspended, and their characterization of FBI practices. The hearing did not produce personnel files, security clearance investigation reports, FBI internal communications about the witnesses, or independent assessments that would allow verification of the witnesses' accounts or the FBI’s justifications.

No classified record access. Security clearance adjudications often involve classified information that cannot be disclosed in open hearings. The hearing presented public characterizations of clearance suspensions without access to underlying classified assessments, security concerns, or investigation findings that may have informed FBI decisions.

Opening statements only analyzed. This reconstruction focuses on the hearing's opening statements and direct witness testimony. The hearing record includes extensive question-and-answer exchanges between members and witnesses that are not analyzed here. Those exchanges may contain additional factual claims, clarifications, or disputes not captured in this reconstruction.

No systemic review. The hearing examined three FBI employees' specific experiences. Whether these cases represent a pattern of FBI whistleblower retaliation, isolated incidents, or appropriate security determinations applied to individuals who happened to make disclosures remained unresolved. The hearing did not produce comprehensive data on FBI whistleblower handling, security clearance revocations, or retaliation complaints across the bureau.

Temporal snapshot. This hearing occurred on May 18, 2023. Security clearance appeals, Merit Systems Protection Board proceedings, Inspector General investigations, or other administrative processes that may have been pending or subsequently concluded are not reflected in this reconstruction.

What was established versus what remained open

The hearing established that three current or former FBI employees experienced security clearance suspensions or revocations and testified that they believed those actions were retaliatory. The fact that clearances were suspended, that the individuals went without pay for extended periods (200 days for O'Boyle, 450 days for Allen per Jordan's opening), and that each witness characterized the actions as retaliation was not contested.

The hearing established competing majority-minority frameworks for evaluating the personnel actions but did not resolve the factual disputes underlying those frameworks. Whether the clearance suspensions were appropriate security determinations, retaliatory personnel actions, or a contested middle ground remained unresolved at the conclusion of the May 18, 2023, hearing.

The hearing established that Friend raised concerns about FBI case management and SWAT tactics, that Allen shared open-source January 6 research with superiors, and that O'Boyle experienced clearance suspension immediately upon arrival at a new assignment. The appropriateness of FBI responses to those activities remained contested.

Sources

U.S. House Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, Hearing on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, Serial No. 118–21, 18 May 2023. Government Publishing Office. https://www.congress.gov/118/chrg/CHRG-118hhrg52419/CHRG-118hhrg52419.pdf

This is a signed reconstruction from the official GPO hearing record. All quoted material is character-exact from the opened primary source. This analysis does not claim access to sealed testimony, classified security clearance adjudication records, FBI personnel files, internal FBI communications, or unpublished committee materials.

Footnotes

1. U.S. House Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, Hearing on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, Serial No. 118–21, 18 May 2023, convening statement. https://www.congress.gov/118/chrg/CHRG-118hhrg52419/CHRG-118hhrg52419.pdf ↩

2. Ibid., table of contents witness listings. ↩ ↩²

3. Ibid., Chair Jim Jordan opening statement. ↩

4. Ibid., Ranking Member Stacey Plaskett opening statement. ↩

5. Ibid., Garrett O'Boyle testimony. ↩

6. Ibid. ↩

7. Ibid. ↩ ↩²

8. Ibid., Stephen Friend testimony. ↩

9. Ibid. ↩

10. Ibid. ↩ ↩²

11. Ibid., Marcus Allen testimony. ↩

12. Ibid. ↩

13. Ibid. ↩ ↩²

14. Ibid. ↩

15. Ibid., Tristan Leavitt testimony. ↩

16. Ibid. ↩

17. Ibid., Chair Jim Jordan opening statement. ↩

18. Ibid. ↩ ↩²

19. Ibid. ↩

20. Ibid. ↩

21. Ibid. ↩

22. Ibid., Ranking Member Stacey Plaskett opening statement. ↩

23. Ibid. ↩ ↩²

24. Ibid. ↩

25. Ibid. ↩

26. Ibid. ↩

27. Ibid., Garrett O'Boyle testimony. ↩

28. Ibid., Stephen Friend testimony. ↩ ↩²

29. Ibid. ↩

30. Ibid., Marcus Allen testimony. ↩ ↩²

31. Ibid. ↩ ↩²

32. Ibid. ↩

33. Ibid., Tristan Leavitt testimony. ↩

34. Ibid. ↩

35. Ibid., Ranking Member Stacey Plaskett opening statement. ↩